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COMMENTS
Elimination of Peacetime Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Over Military Dependents and Employees in
Foreign Countries
As a result of several recent cases,' the United States Su-
preme Court has declared Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice unconstitutional. This provision granted juris-
diction to military courts-martial over "persons serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the
United States."'2
1. Grisham v. Hagan, 80 Sup. Ct. 310 (1960) ; McElroy v. United States e.z
rel. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960); Wilson v. Bohlender, 80 Sup. Ct. 305(1960) ; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960). See
also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
2. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 2(11), ch. 1041, 70A STAT. 37
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It will be the purpose of this Comment to examine the his-
torical background of military jurisdiction over these two classes
of civilians in peacetime, and to explore the issues of constitu-
tional law which are involved in the decisions, as well as the
potential effects of the holdings.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 2 (11),
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
The Constitution requires that an accused citizen be afforded
a grand jury indictment and a trial by jury of his peers, except
in "cases arising in the land and naval forces."'3 In several cases,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the grant of
power to Congress embodied in Article I, Section 8, Clause 14
(commonly termed the Clause 14 power) "to make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" in-
cludes the power to provide for trial without a jury.4 The deter-
mination of precisely which persons were to be included in the
group subject to military justice has caused much confusion in
the past.
Whether or not civilians should be subjected to the juris-
diction of military courts has been a persistent problem since
the formative years of the nation, and the attitudes and tradi-
tions operating on the development of this area of the law may
be traced back to seventeenth century England. The Articles of
War which authorized the trial of soldiers for non-military
crimes by courts-martial were promulgated during this period.,
This action hastened the drafting of the Bill of Rights,6 which
protected the right of trial by jury. Against this background,
two of the greatest English jurists, Lord Chief Justice Hale7
and Sir William Blackstone,8 expressed sharp hostility to any
(1956), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (Supp. V, 1958):
"The following persons are subject to this chapter:
"(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or
may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and
outside the following: the Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands."
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43 (1942) (dictum) ; Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2, 137-38 (1866) (concurring opinion) (dictum) ; In re Waidman, 42 F.2d
239, 240-41 (D. Me. 1930).
5. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 920 (2d ed. 1920).
6. 1 Will. & Mar., ch. 2.
7. HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSES OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 40, 41
(1st ed. 1713).
8. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413 (1766).
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expansion of the jurisdiction of military courts. The generation
that adopted the American Constitution was distrustful of the
military;9 but despite this feeling that the military should be
kept subordinate to civil authority, there was recognized a need
for control of certain persons serving with the Army who were
not soldiers. The Articles of War of 1775,10 under which the
American Revolutionary Army was originally governed, pro-
vided for the trial by courts-martial of civilians serving with
t6e army, and subsequent amendments gave expanded descrip-
tions of these civilians." There are numerous instances of trials
of civilian servants such as "wagon-masters," '1 2 "waggoners,"' 3
and "express riders,' 1 4 detailed in Washington's writings. Prob-
ably 'influenced by these developments, the framers of the Con-
stitution gave to the Congress the power "to make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."'15
The first complete enactment of the Articles of War was effected
in 18066 and the enactment continued the jurisdictions over
persons serving with the armies in the field even though they
were not enlisted soldiers. At the time these Articles were en-
acted, there was no thought of deploying military forces beyond
the boundaries of this country and it was felt that they were only
applicable in the continental United States."7
The American intervention in Cuba in 1906 illustrated the
need for an expansion of the jurisdiction of military courts over
civilian dependents and employees following the armed forces in
occupations of foreign territories.' The revision of the Articles
of War in 1916 gave the military jurisdiction over "all such re-
tainers and persons accompanying or serving with the armies
of the United States in the field, both within and without the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 9 (Emphasis
added.) This Article remains substantially the same in its pres-
ent form as Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
9. 1 WELLS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SAmrUEL ADAMS 231 (1865).
10. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 956 (2d ed. 1920).
11. Id. at 963-64.
12. 10 WRITINGS OF WASINGTON 359.
13. 11 id. at 487.
14. 20 id. at 24.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
16. Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 STAT. 359.
*e17. See supplemental brief for appellant and petitioner on rehearing, p. 42,
Aeid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
18. S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Seas. 37-38 (1916).
19. 39 STAT. 651 (1916).
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. It has been held consistently that in time of war the military
has jurisdiction over persons directly connected with the armed
forces.20 Although not in time of war, special circumstances
necessitated the decisions in the cases of Ex parte Reed2' and
Johnson v. Sayre22 which dealt with jurisdiction over ,civilian
naval paymasters who committed offenses while on board ship,
and in each the Supreme Court affirmed the military jurisdic-
tion. In a similar vein are cases dealing with trials of military
personnel by non-military courts created by Congress to try of-
fenses in territorial possessions of the United States. The pro-
cedure of these courts calls for neither grand jury indictment
nor trial by jury. In re Ross 23 involved an American seaman
tried and convicted of murder by a non-military court in Japan;
the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional
guarantee of grand jury indictment and trial by jury did not
extend beyond the boundaries of the United States. This state-
ment, however, has been repudiated by numerous cases.24 In the
Insular cases, 25 the Court upheld Congress' refusal to provide
these constitutional rights in the territorial possessions, where it
was considered inexpedient to require the procedure of jury
trials in countries unfamiliar with the American system of
justice.26
EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON MILITARY
JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS OVERSEAS
Article 2(11) grants jurisdiction over civilians to the mili-
tary courts in accordance with "any treaty ... or agreement to
which the United States is or may be a party." A brief exami-
nation of the provisions of such treaties as the NATO Status of
Forces agreements will demonstrate their effect on this area of
military jurisdiction prior to the decision of the recent cases.
A sovereign nation has the exclusive jurisdiction to punish
20. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313 (1946), the Supreme Court
spoke of the "well established power of the military to exercise jurisdiction over
members of the armed forces [and] those directly connected with such forces" in
time of actual conflict. See also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955).
21. 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
22. 158 U.S. 109 (1895).
23. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
24. See cases cited in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 9, n. 10 (1957).
25. E.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ; Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
26. Note, 19 LouiSIANA LAW REVIEW 190, 193, n. 21 (1958).
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offenses against its laws, committed within its borders, unless it
expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.2 7
This consent has been granted through the various status of
forces agreements now in force,28 which accord United States
military authorities the right to exercise jurisdiction over "per-
sons subject to the military law." 29 The agreements grant the
military primary jurisdiction over employees accompanying the
military contingent overseas, for offenses arising out of the
execution of official duty, or for those solely against American
personnel or property.8 0 The foreign sovereign has primary
jurisdiction over dependents,81 but the United States can exercise
concurrent jurisdiction by securing a special waiver from the
foreign sovereign. This distinction between dependents and em-
ployees apparently was drawn intentionally by the drafters of
the agreement. Its net result is to grant the foreign sovereign
jurisdiction over dependents for all offenses except those solely
against the law of the United States, while giving the United
States military authorities wider latitude over employees. 82
THE RECENT DECISIONS
Military Jurisdiction for Capital Offenses over Civilian Depend-
ents Overseas
In the companion cases of Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v.
Krueger,3 the United States Supreme Court was confronted
squarely with the constitutionality of court-martial trials for
capital offenses committed by civilian dependents on overseas
bases. A divided court held that these dependents could not be
tried by courts-martial for such offenses and that Congress was
not empowered under Clause 14 to provide for such jurisdiction
in the future. Writing for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice
Black discounted the previous reliance on the Ross and Insular
cases, going so far as to say that "the Ross case should be left
as a relic from a different era" 4 and that "neither the (Insular)
27. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) ; Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,
11 U.S. 116 (1812).
28. See Agreement Among the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding
the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S. TREATIES AND OTmE INT'L
AGREEMENTS 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
29. NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT art. VII, para. 1(a) (1953).
30. Id. art. VII, para. 3(a).
31. Id. art. VII, para. 3.
32. See SNEE & PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND CRIMINAL JURIS-
DICTION 34-40 (1957).
33. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
34. Id. at 12.
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cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expan-
sion.' '3 5 The opinion did not delineate between capital and non-
capital cases but based the decision on the "status" theory, stat-
ing that "the authority conferred by clause 14 does not encom-
pass persons who cannot fairly be said to be 'in' the military
service. '8 6 It did not distinguish between different classes of
civilians in similar situations, but broadly held that civilians
could never be held amenable to military jurisdiction in time of
peace. A salient feature of this opinion is that it refused to
acknowledge that the necessary and proper clause, in conjunc-
tion with the Clause 14 power, could operate "to extend military
jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond that class described
in Clause 14 - 'the land and naval Forces'. '3 7 In an attempt to
define the boundaries of the class which should be included in
the "land and naval forces," the Court said that the wives of
servicemen are definitely not to be included in this category, but
there is language which indicates "that there might be circum-
stances where a person could be 'in' the armed services for pur-
poses of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted
into the military or did not wear a uniform. '8 5 (Emphasis
added.)
Military Jurisdiction for Non-Capital Offenses over Dependents
Overseas
After the Covert decision, there remained unsettled the ques-
tions of military jurisdiction over civilian dependents accused of
non-capital offenses, and the constitutionality of military trial
of civilian employees charged with either capital or non-capital
offenses committed overseas. These areas have been clarified by
four companion cases, decided recently, which will be considered
separately according to the classification of persons with which
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 23. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred on the narrow ground that
the holding should be applicable only to the exercise of peacetime military juris-
diction over civilian dependents in capital cases. He also disagreed with the
Court's discarding the Ross and Insular cases, and demonstrated by historical
analysis that the holdings should still be regarded as vital when viewed in context
with their own particular circumstances and settings. Mr. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion was similarly limited to capital offenses, and he criticized the
Court's holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be considered in
conjunction with Clause 14 in a determination of the extent of military jurisdiction
ovei civilians. Mr. Justices Clark and Burton, dissenting, felt that the wives of
servicemen were "as much a part of the military installation as were their hus-
bands," and that they should be considered a part of the "land and naval forces"
for purposes of Clause 14 power.
19601
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they deal. In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,3 9 the
Court held Article 2 (11) of the UCMJ unconstitutional when ap-
plied to give courts-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents
charged with non-capital offenses. 40 As in Covert, the Court
denied that the Necessary and Proper Clause could extend the
Clause 14 power to include civilians charged with non-capital
offenses. The Court in the Singleton case affirmed the status
theory advanced in the Covert decision, holding that the accused
was not in sufficient "'proximity, physical and social, . . . to
the "land and naval Forces" . . . as reasonably to demonstrate
a justification' "41 for an extension of military jurisdiction in
her case. The Government contended that the courts-martial
should be accorded jurisdiction in this situation because of the
need, from a morale standpoint, for dependents to acompany the
forces overseas, and a concomitant need for a source of discipli-
nary control over these dependents. The Court discounted these
contentions, quoting a statement from United States ex rel. Toth v.
United States to the effect that no" ' considerations of discipline'
could provide an excuse for 'new expansion of court-martial
jurisdiction at the expense of normal and constitutionally pref-
erable systems of trial by jury.' "42 The Court was also reluctant
to permit prosecution of non-capital offenses, while rejecting
capital ones under Covert, because it felt that this would place
"an unreviewable discretion to exercise jurisdiction over civilian
dependents simply by downgrading the offense, thus stripping
the accused of his constitutional rights and protections. ' 43
Thus, it is clear from the Covert and Singleton cases that
Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is uncon-
stitutional as applied to civilian dependents accompanying the
armed forces overseas in peacetime, charged with either capital
or non-capital offenses.
Military Jurisdiction over Civilian Employees Overseas Charged
with Capital and Nan-Capital Offenses in Peacetime
In Grisham v. Hagan,44 the Court encountered the application
of Article 2(11) to a civilian employee charged with the capital
39. 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960).
40. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Clark, who dissented. from the
decision in the Covert case, wrote the majority opinion in this group of cases.
41. 80 Sup. Ct. 297, 301 (1960), quoting from Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
46-47 (1957) (concurring opinion).
42. Id. at 300.
43. Id. at 302.
44. 80 Sup. Ct. 310 (1960).
[Vol. XX
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offense of premeditated murder. He was found guilty of the
lesser and included offense of unpremeditated murder, and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. While serving a reduced term, he
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that Article
2 (11) was unconstitutional as applied to him. After dismissal of
the writ below,4 5 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
that the case was controlled by the rule of Covert. The Court
stated that "continued adherence to Covert requires civilian em-
ployees to be afforded the same right of trial by jury' 46 as de-
pendents have, in capital cases.
Article 2 (11) was held unconstitutional when applied to civil-
ian employees charged with non-capital offenses in the cases of
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo47 and Wilson v. Boh-
lender.48 The Court held that these cases were controlled by the
decision in the Singleton case, holding that dependents are not
amenable to military justice for non-capital crimes. Acknowl-
edging the existence of historical evidence supporting the expan-
sion of military jurisdiction to cover civilian employees, the opin-
ion deems it insufficient to form a solid historical basis.
49
45. 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1959).
46. 80 Sup. Ct. 310, 311 (1960).
47. 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960). Respondent, while serving as a civilian electrical
lineman with the Air Force in Morocco, was tried and convicted by court-martial
of larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. He filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court for the District of Columbia, which was dismissed.
158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1958). The court of appeals reversed the dismissal.
259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 359 U.S.
904 (1959).
48. 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960). Petitioner, a civilian auditor employed by the
Army in Berlin, was tried and convicted by court-martial of sodomy. His petition
to the United States District Court for Colorado for a writ of habeas corpus was
dismissed. Appeal was perfected to the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari prior to argument. 359 U.S. 906 (1959).
49. 80 Sup. Ct. 305, 308 (1960), quoting from Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 64
(1957) (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, dissented from the holding insofar as it withheld jurisdiction from military
courts in non-capital cases, but concurred in the holding as applied to capital
cases. He spoke of the Court's passing over too lightly "the awesome finality of
a capital case," a factor which has induced the institution of special procedural
safeguards for those charged with such offenses. The Court's definition of mili-
tary jurisdiction in terms of "status" was criticized as being but one of several
factors in a consideration of the exercise of such power, and one which should
not be the sole determinative factor. Mr. Justice Harlan preferred the test of
"closeness or remoteness of the relationship between the person affected and the
military establishment," and applied that test to the persons in the non-capital
cases to conclude that they should be amenable to military jurisdiction. The effect
of the decisions on the nation's agreements with foreign countries in which troops
are stationed was mentioned, the Justices expressing the fear that much of the
jurisdiction which the government has over its overseas personnel under Status
of Forces agreements will have to be relinquished. Mr. Justice Whittaker, with
Mr. Justice Stewart, distinguished between dependents and employees, concluding
that the former should not be subject to military jurisdiction, but that the latter
should. While agreeing with the majority that there can be no valid distinction
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It may be concluded from the holdings of the Covert, Single-
ton, Grisham, Guagliardo, and Wilson cases that Article 2 (11) is
unconstitutional as applied to either civilian dependents or civil-
ian employees accompanying the forces to overseas bases in
peacetime, who are charged with any offense, either capital or
non-capital.
EVALUATION OF THE RECENT CASES IN RELATION TO
THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact all laws
that are necessary and proper to execute its enumerated pow-
ers. 50 Chief Justice Marshall gave the Necessary and Proper
Clause a broad interpretation in McCulloch v. Maryland5 when
he observed that Congress must be allowed the discretion which
would enable it to perform the duties assigned to it in the way
most beneficial to the people. 52
This interpretation has served as a basis for a great expan-
sion of governmental powers in time of war or armed rebellion.
John Quincy Adams characterized the "peace powers" as being
closely limited by constitutional and statutory regulations and
the "war powers" as being limited only by the "usages of na-
tions." 53 He termed the war power "tremendous" and felt that
although it is within the constitutional limits of governmental
power, it "breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for
the protection of liberty and life. '5 4
This description of the war power has proven to be, in the
most part, accurate. The Supreme Court, as early as 1871, sus-
tained a manifestation of this broad power when it upheld the
Civil War Confiscation Acts.55 During World War I, it sustained
the Selective Draft Law of 191756 and upheld government opera-
tion of all transportation systems.57 During and after World
between capital and non-capital offenses under Article 2(11), this opinion develops
the history of military jurisdiction over civilian employees, and concludes that
the drafters of the Constitution fully intended to include such persons within
the purview of the Clause 14 power "to make rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and naval forces." Employees are viewed by Mr. Justice Whit-
taker as being "so closely related to and intertwined with [the military] forces as
to make their government essential to the government of those forces."
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
51. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
52. Id. at 421.
53. Quoted in CoawIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITuTION 78 (1948).
54. Ibid.
55. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268 (1871).
56. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
57. Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919).
[Vol. XX
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War II, courts upheld the power of Congress to govern commod-
ity prices through the Emergency Price Control Act,5 8 sustained
the imposition of fines on conscientious objectors who refused
to register for the draft,5 9 and held the Housing and Rent Act of
1947 constitutional as a proper exercise of the war power.0° In
the so-called "Japanese Exclusion" cases, the Supreme Court up-
held the establishment of a system of evacuation from designated
military areas, applicable to persons of Japanese ancestry, and
an accompanying measure which placed a curfew upon these per-
sons while they remained in the military area prior to evacua-
tion."' This substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citi-
zens based upon race or ancestry was viewed by Mr. Justice Mur-
phy as going to the "very brink of constitutional power," 62 but
he acknowledged that it was a proper exercise of the war power.
In sustaining the power of Congress to control rents after the
war, the court made it clear that the war power "does not neces-
sarily end with the cessation of hostilities," 63 provided it is em-
ployed to cope with a condition of which the "war was a direct
and immediate cause. ' 64 Similarly, in 1949 the conviction of the
wife of an Army lieutenant by a military commission in Ger-
many for her husband's murder was upheld by the Court on the
grounds that, although actual hostilities had ceased, the jurisdic-
tion over the dependent was justified by the war power of Con-
gress.6 15 It was held that the need for the exercise of the war
power still existed in Germany in 1949 because of the occupation
then in effect in that area.
Congress has given the military full jurisdiction over all
civilians with the forces "in the field" during time of war. 6 This
grant has been repeatedly upheld by the courts as a constitu-
tional exercise of congressional power. 67 However, the Court re-
fused to take the position that this broad power was applicable
in the instant cases. In Covert, the Court refused to acknowledge
58. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1943).
59. United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1950).
60. Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
61. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
62. Id. at 233 (dissenting opinion).
63. Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948).
64. Id. at 144.
65. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
66. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(10)(Supp. V, 1958).
67. Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327,
U.S. 777 (1945), cert. dismissed, 328 U.S. 822 (1945) ; McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53
F. Supp. 80 (D.C. Va. 1943) ; Em parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (D.C. Tex. 1919);
Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D.C.N.J. 1918).
1960]
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that the Necessary and Proper Clause could be used to extend
the Clause 14 power to provide jurisdiction over civilians. The
reason given by Mr. Justice Black for this position was that
"having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of
Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope
of Clause 14."8 This statement was severely criticized in all of
the instant cases. Mr. Justice Whittaker illustrated, through an
analysis of the language of the Fifth Amendment which excepts
from its guarantees "cases arising in the land or naval forces"
(emphasis added), that the operation of the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause should not be rejected in such an important area of
the law, because the framers did not intend the Clause 14 power
to be restricted by the provisions of Article III 9 or the Fifth70
and Sixth Amendments. 71
In the light of the existing pressures of international tension,
it would appear that Mr. Justice Whittaker's position is to be
considered the more reasonable interpretation of the effect
which the Necessary and Proper Clause should be allowed to
exert in this area. As mentioned above, the "war power" of Con-
gress has been allowed to operate freely, through use of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, even after actual hostilities have
ceased. It is difficult to perceive a rational reason for the
Court's allowing the dependent in Madsen and Kinsella2 to be
tried by a military commission through the use of the "war pow-
er" rationale, while holding that the offender in Kinsella v.
Krueger73 could not be tried by military courts-martial when her
crime occurred in Japan at a time when that country served as a
logistics and aviation base for actual hostilities then being waged
in Korea. In fact, it would appear that the situation in Japan in
1954 demanded the exercise of the war power much more than
that existing in Germany in 1949.
68. 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957).
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State,
the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have di-
rected."
70. Id. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger. .. ."
71. Id. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ..
72. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
73. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
[Vol. XX
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The ever-present threat of nuclear warfare, the increasing
pressure of the missile race, and the various international diplo-
matic tactics have dictated the necessity of a far-flung military
system, with forces stationed in foreign nations. These condi-
tions demand maximum efficiency in the operation of these in-
stallations, and such efficient operation can be effected only if
the military commander responsible for the satisfactory dis-
charge of each unit's mission is accorded broad disciplinary and
control powers. This authority is needed to govern such prob-
lems as dope traffic, black-market operations, on-base traffic
control, emergency evacuations, and security violations, to enu-
merate only a few of the most critical areas.
74
Hamilton once proclaimed that the Clause 14 power should
be left to exist "without limitation" because of the impossibility
of predicting future national "exigencies. ' 75 The exigencies now
existing are of a seemingly potentially disastrous nature, but the
Court's decisions in the instant cases have placed severe restric-
tions on Congress' capacity to deal effectively with these devel-
opments- restrictions which the framers of the Constitution
sought to avoid.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY JURISDICTION
OVER CIVILIANS OVERSEAS
Now that Article 2 (11) has been declared unconstitutional as
applied to offenses committed by civilians overseas with the mili-
tary during peace time, there exists the problem of which forum
will try these persons. Some suggested methods of solution to
the unanswered problem will be enumerated and the objections
thereto will be examined.
Trial in the United States
If Congress were to decide that these civilians were to be
tried by a district court in the United States, the accused might
be deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of "compulsory proc-
ess for obtaining witnesses in his favor," as foreign nationals,
absent a treaty arrangefnent, could not be compelled to leave
their country to appear in a trial in a United States court, and
such appearances would have to be on a voluntary basis.
74. See supplemental brief for appellant and petitioner on rehearing, App. A,
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See, generally, United States v. Burney, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 776, 800, 21 C.M.R. 98, 122 (1956).
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Hamilton) (Tudor ed. 1947).
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There is a further difficulty in the requirement of the Sixth
Amendment that the accused have the right of confrontation of
adverse witnesses. This right may be waived, 76 but if the of-
fender declined to waive the right, depositions would be inadmis-
sible, and the Government would be required to provide these
witnesses at the trial, in some manner.
As the venue requirement of the Sixth Amendment has been
held to have "reference only to offenses against the United
States committed within a state," 77 this provision would raise no
constitutional problems, and the Congress would be empowered
to direct the place of trial under the Constitution. 7
Even if the constitutional objections to this alternative were
resolved, there are other practical problems to be considered,
such as the prohibitive cost of transporting evidence and wit-
nesses to this country, the delays involved which would result in
a dilution of the deterrent effect of the prosecution, and the im-
practicability of bringing to trial in the United States the large
number of petty offenders such as black market operators. Both
the constitutional and practical objections to the proposal make
it appear unworkable.
Trial by Special Federal Courts at Overseas Bases
Under the power given Congress by Article III, 7 9 to establish
inferior courts, it might be possible to establish a system of fed-
eral courts at overseas bases. This proposal is seriously defective
because of the problem of impanelling an impartial jury, as re-
quired by the Sixth Amendment. If the jury were selected
wholly from the personnel on the military installation, certain
problems would immediately be presented. The Supreme Court
has upheld a conviction of violation of a federal narcotics law by
a jury composed entirely of government employees, two of whom
were directly connected with the department responsible for en-
forcing this statute.8 0 It is to be noted, however, that the panel
of prospective jurors included an equal proportion of private
citizens, who were all peremptorily challenged by the defendant.
76. Levine v. United States, 182 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 921 (1950) ; Kemp v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938 (5th Cir.
1948); Burgess v. King, 130 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1942).
77. Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891). See also United States
v. Dawson, 56 U.S. 467, 487 (1853) ; Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921,
931, n. 3 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
79. Ibid.
80. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
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Since all prospective jurors on the military base would be gov-
ernment employees, or dependents, there could be no such distri-
bution.
If the jury were composed of military personnel and their
dependents, its make-up would closely parallel that of a court-
martial, subject to the same "command influence" of which the
Court spoke in Covert.81 Since most overseas bases are relative-
ly small communities, the rate of social contact between the per-
sonnel, both military and civilian, is high. This situation could
tend to diminish the possibility that a jury chosen from this com-
runity would be entirely free of bias or prior opinion as to guilt
or innocence of the accused. Should the jury be selected from the
citizens of the foreign country in which the offense occurred,
such citizens probably could not be compelled to attend the trial,
in the absence of new treaty negotiations. The problem of the
language barrier would also be present.
If all these difficulties were solved in some manner, the cost
of setting up a federal court at each of the bases in the sixty-
three foreign countries where troops are stationed would be
large. This cost element could be diminished by the institution
of a traveling United States court with a federal district judge
who could go "on circuit" as cases arose at the various military
installations abroad. Of course, such a system would be encum-
bered by the same difficulties in the area of jury selection as
would the system of individual courts at each military base. Fur-
thermore, although the United States has been granted permis-
sion to utilize its military courts in the receiving states, there is
a possibility that the national pride of a foreign sovereign would
be offended by the presence of the complete American judicial
process on its soil.
It would appear that this alternative would take away from
the accused one of the most important constitutional rights
which the court sought to protect in the present cases - that of
trial by a fair and impartial jury. Due to this shortcoming, as
well as other problems discussed, this proposal seems to be un-
acceptable under the present cases.
Civilian Induction Program
Mr. Justice Clark suggested in McElroy that all civilian em-
ployees be inducted into the service pursuant to a program such
81. 354 U.S. 1, 36, 37 (1957). For a different view of the nature of court
martial proceedings, see Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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as that used by the military to "draft" doctors and dentists.8 2
This proposition is open to several objections. Such a plan as
this would be merely a device of subterfuge, which would under-
mine the constitutional rights which the Court sought to secure
by these decisions. It seems contradictory that the Court would
sponsor such a circumvention of constitutional rights in an
opinion the primary objective of which is to assure that these
rights will not be violated. This is not an area in which artifices
should be devised to evade the important problem thrust into
being by these decisions, i.e., the manner in which the civilian
may be accorded all the rights to which he is entitled under these
rulings.8 3
The McElroy opinion alluded to another problem inherent in
this alternative. Mr. Justice Clark stated that "some workers
might hesitate to give up their civilian status for government
employment overseas. 8 1 4 It is believed that many workers would
refuse to give up their civilian status, if this program were ad-
ministered on a voluntary basis, particularly in the light of the
keen competition offered by private industry for highly skilled
technical and scientific personnel. As this group of civilian em-
ployees is the one for which the most crucial need exists today,
and would probably be most affected by this element of competi-
tion, this program might pose a much greater threat to the de-
fense posture than the Court seemed willing to recognize.
Although Mr. Justice Clark only directed his suggestion at
the problem of employees, there would also be a possibility of
granting military status to dependents. This, of course, would
be subject to all the above objections, along with problems pecul-
iar to the dependent class of civilians, such as whether persons
would be accorded pay and rank if granted military status and
whether minor dependents could be made members of the mili-
tary. Because of the problems inherent in this alternative, it
seems that the civilian induction program is not feasible.
Elimination of Overseas Dependent Travel
It was suggested in Singleton that the answer to the disci-
plinary problem might be to disallow civilian dependents over-
82. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 80 Sup Ct. 305, 309 (1960).
See 67 STAT. 89 (1953), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 454(i) (1951).
83. It may also be asked whether the institution of such a program as this
would be a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary
servitude.
84. 80 Sup. Ct. 305, 309 (1960).
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seas.8 5 Because of the immense scope of overseas operations at
the present time, a steadily increasing number of troops are be-
ing deployed to bases abroad. The value of these foreign bases
is inestimable in this era of push-button warfare. Personnel who
man these posts should not be deprived of the privilege of hav-
ing their families accompany them to overseas duty; such a dras-
tic measure would probably be detrimental to morale, and would
seem unwarranted in view of the small number of offenses com-
mitted by dependents overseas.86 Furthermore this plan gives no
aid whatever in the problem of employees.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
The rights of indictment and jury trial are personal privi-
leges which the accused may forego at his election,87 thus pre-
senting two possible methods of solution of the problem at hand.
The military could require the execution of a waiver as a pre-
requisite to overseas travel by civilian employees or dependents.
However, there are certain procedural restrictions on the use of
the waiver technique that would raise serious objections to its
validity. A waiver of indictment must be executed in open court,
after the accused has been advised of the nature of the charge.88
The same general rule has been held to apply in the waiving of a
trial by jury. 9 If these safeguards are to be respected, any re-
quirement of waiver as a prerequisite to overseas travel of civil-
ians would be ineffective. A more feasible manner in which this
waiver procedure could be handled would be to allow the civilian
to choose between trial by court-martial or trial by the foreign
sovereign after the commission of the offense. If the offender
refused to relinquish his rights, the United States could refrain
from requesting a waiver of jurisdiction from the foreign gov-
ernment, and the accused would be left to foreign justice.
Both alternatives in the waiver proposal have the advantage
of avoiding the necessity of re-negotiation of treaties or institu-
tion of separate court systems. But, as in the case of the civilian
85. 80 Sup. Ct. 297, 303 (1960).
86. See supplemental brief for appellant and petitioner on rehearing, App. B,
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
87. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) ; Barkman
v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947);
Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
616 (1941). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), 7(b), 23(a).
88. FED. R. CaIM. P. 7 (b).




induction program, those rights which the Court sought to guard
in these cases will not be accorded to the civilians who choose to
exercise the waiver. Those who refuse to waive their rights will
be subject to the justice of the foreign country, an alternative
which is frequently undesirable, as discussed below. Either al-
ternative would operate as an avoidance of the rights of the civil-
ians under the Constitution, as proclaimed by the instant cases,
and would serve to subvert the intent of the Court.
Trial by the Foreign Sovereign
The remaining alternative, one which Mr. Justice Clark dis-
senting in Covert, termed "the alternative that the Congress will
now be forced to choose," 90 is that of trial by the foreign country
in which the crime was committed. By the terms of international
agreements now in force, United States military authorities are
granted the right to try only those "persons subject to the mili-
tary law."91 By this definition, all civilians are presently amen-
able only to the jurisdiction of the foreign country in which they
are stationed. This development might bring about a loss of cer-
tain constitutional rights for the accused, and might in some
cases result in subjecting citizens to the "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments"9 2 which are condemned in the Eighth Amendment.
9 3
Further, there is a possibility that the foreign sovereign will not
prosecute offenses involving only United States citizens. An-
other factor is that the foreign government will only prosecute
offenses against its laws, thereby leaving unpunished crimes
against the United States.9 4
CONCLUSION
As a result of the instant cases, a quandary has been created
as to the proper method by which to implement the Court's rul-
ings. Furthermore, it is believed that the Court's refusal to con-
sider the impact of the holdings on military discipline a "rele-
vant consideration" 95 was inopportune in view of the necessity
90. 354 U.S. 1, 88 (1957).
91. NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT art. VII, para. 1(a) (1953).
92. "In view of the fact that Article 12 of the French Code Penal requires the
use of the Guillotine, it is interesting to speculate as to whether that instrument
would meet due process requirements." Note, 18 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 173,
177, n. 20 (1957).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
94. A Senate Resolution (S. Res. 253) has been adopted which creates a
select committee to study the problems presented by the instant cases. 106 CONG.
Rac. 623, 628 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1960).
95. 80 Sup. Ct. 297, 302 (1960).
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that foreign bases be manned in the most efficient manner. It
is submitted that questions of discipline, as well as of morale and
security, are relevant considerations in this area.
It appears that these decisions could have been avoided by
using the Necessary and Proper Clause to sustain military juris-
diction over employees and dependents. The cases seem unfor-
tunate when viewed against the lack of practicable answers to
the problem of where these persons will be tried and the unsatis-
factory consequences which will probably flow from the adoption
of any of the available solutions.
James A. George
The Wife's Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium
Prior to 1950 the right of a wife to recover for loss of con-
sortium" resulting from the negligent injury of her husband by
a third person was not recognized. 2 In that year, however, in
the landmark case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 3 the Court of Ap-
peal for the District of Columbia recognized the wife's right to
such recovery. This decision has resulted in an extensive re-
examination of the question by courts in many other jurisdic-
tions. It is the purpose of this Comment to determine the pres-
ent status of this right and to examine the bases of the decisions.
The concept of consortium originated in the early common
law as a right in the husband to the material services of his
wife.4 With the passage of time, this concept was expanded to
include other components of the marriage relation- society,
sexual relations, and conjugal affection." At common law the hus-
band's interest was protected against such interferences with the
1. Consortium has been defined as "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife,
and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other
in every conjugal relation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY (4th ed. 1957).
2. See note 15 infra.
3. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). There
were two major holdings of the Hitaffer decision - (1) a wife has a cause of
action for loss of consortium resulting from negligent injury of her husband by a
third person, and (2) that this right was not barred by the "exclusive remedy"
provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The
second holding has been overruled subsequently. See note 20 infra.
4. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139; Lippman, The Breakdown of Con-
aortium, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 651 (1930).
5. See PROSSER, TORTS 683 (2d ed. 1955) ; Holbrook, The Change in the Mean-
ing of Con8ortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1923) ; Lippman, The Breakdown of
Conaortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662 (1930). These three aspects have been
labeled the "sentimental components" of marriage.
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